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Abstract 
We describe research into the identification of anomalous 
events and event patterns as manifested in computer 
system logs.  Prototype software has been developed with 
a capability that identifies anomalous events based on 
usage patterns or user profiles, and alerts administrators 
when such events are identified.  To reduce the number of 
false positive alerts we have investigated the use of 
different user profile training techniques and introduce 
the use of abstractions to group together applications 
which are related.  Our results suggest that the number of 
false alerts that are generated is significantly reduced 
when a growing time window is used for user profile 
training and when abstraction into groups of applications 
is used. 
Keywords:  User profiling, insider misuse, abstraction. 
1 Introduction1 
Computer crime continues to be problematic for both 
public and private sectors not only in Australia but at an 
international level.  Over 50% of respondents to the 2006 
Computer Security Institute/FBI Computer Crime and 
Security Survey (Gordon, Loeb et al. 2006) reported 
unauthorized use of computer systems.  In an equivalent 
Australian survey, the 2006 Australian Computer Crime 
and Security Survey (AusCERT 2006), 22% of 
respondents reported experiencing one or more electronic 
attacks. 
The field of computer forensics has been rapidly 
expanding in the past twenty years in an effort to combat 
the continuing increase in the incidence of criminal 
activity involving computers.  This field is normally 
defined around the identification, securing and analysis of 
evidence for eventual presentation in a court of law.  Few 
cases result in a criminal prosecution and a broader 
definition of computer forensics can be made that simply 
attempts to detect, secure and analyse evidence from 
computer systems.  This may be done by an organization, 
for instance, in response to a security incident, internal or 
external. 
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The surveys highlight that the most common types of 
criminal activity are the results of virus, worm or Trojan 
infections.  Insider abuse of Internet access, email or 
computer system resources, however, is the third most 
common type of misuse in the United States of America 
(Gordon, Loeb et al. 2006) and the second most common 
type of misuse in Australia (AusCERT 2006).   
Insider misuse can be defined as the performance of 
activities where computers and networks in an 
organization are deliberately misused by those who are 
authorized to use them.  Some activities which can be 
categorized as insider misuse include: 
 unauthorized access to information which is an 
abuse of privileges 
 unauthorized use of software or applications for 
purposes other than carrying out one’s duties 
 theft or breach of proprietary or confidential 
information 
 theft or unauthorized use of staff or customer’s 
access credentials  
 computer facilitated financial fraud 
This paper reports on work aimed at detecting 
anomalous events that may be indicators of insider 
misuse.  More specifically we attempt to detect 
unauthorized use of software applications by users from 
within an organization.  Our general approach has been to 
build user profiles from computer security audit logs 
which record the applications used.  In particular, we 
have used the security audit log from computers running 
the Windows XP operating system for this work.   
While we have based this research on a specific 
operating system, the approach may be generalised to any 
operating system or computer system, such as an ERP 
system, which records user’s activities as events.   
We have created user profiles from data recorded in 
the Windows Security log by identifying the processes or 
applications run by a computer user.  The events recorded 
in the Windows security audit log can be correlated to 
determine when a process was started and terminated by 
the user or the system.  Data from the correlated events 
can be stored and queried for post hoc investigation of a 
user’s activities on the computer.  User profiles include 
information on which times of the day or week the 
various applications were used by an individual and also 
record the first time an application was used by the user. 
Users in an organization may have specific duties 
which they carry out on a routine basis at various times of 
the working day or week.  A sudden departure from 
routine may be an indicator that the user is not carrying 
  
out their routine duties.  Use of applications outside of 
regular working hours may also be an indicator of misuse 
of the computer system.   
The first use of an application may be an indicator of a 
user installing software which is outside of an 
organization’s Standard Operating Environment (SOE) if 
they have the privileges to do so.  It may also simply be 
the user using an application from the SOE for the first 
time. 
We define an alert for this work as the result of 
detecting a user instigated event which is atypical for that 
user given their past usage history based on certain 
criteria.  The criteria we have used for generating alerts 
are based on the situations mentioned above, i.e. first use 
of an application and usage of an application at times 
outside the norm for the user. 
When the use of new applications or use of 
applications outside of a user’s typical profile is detected 
alerts can be generated but many of these are likely to be 
false positives.  Any approach which aims to detect 
anomalous usage must also concentrate on reduction in 
the number of false positives to have any benefit to an 
organization. 
It is likely that a user’s profile will not remain static 
but will vary as the user’s duties change or the 
organization’s SOE changes.  It is therefore a requirement 
of such a system which detects anomalous usage that it be 
flexible or dynamic in its generation of user profiles.  In 
this paper we present two options for the generation of 
dynamic user profiles. 
The options for creation or training of user profiles 
and the possibilities for making a user profile dynamic 
are discussed in Section 2.2.   
After user profiles have been generated, each profile 
can be used as the basis for comparing that user’s 
activities in the period following that on which the profile 
was created.  Any activity out of the ordinary for a 
profiled user can be flagged to generate an alert to system 
administrators.   
A potential problem in work of this nature is that a 
large number of alerts may be generated by the simple 
alert types we defined, and furthermore, many of these 
may be false positives.  In a large organization, large 
numbers of alerts generated for each and every user may 
be costly to investigate.   
To reduce the number of alerts generated we have 
created abstractions based on the applications used.  The 
abstractions group similar applications together, rather 
than using the full and raw process path and name that is 
recorded in the security audit log.  
The first abstraction, which we name process families, 
is created by manually assigning applications with a 
similar purpose to a family of applications.  The second 
abstraction, process groups, uses a clustering technique to 
create groups of applications based on the name of the 
process’ executable file and path.  Further detail on the 
design of these abstractions is discussed in Section 2.3.    
We show that when these abstractions are used as the 
basic unit for the user profile rather than the individual 
processes, the number of alerts generated is reduced.  
Section 2.3 discusses the development of the abstractions. 
Details of our implementation and experimental 
methodology are given in Section 3.  Results for the 
number of alerts generated from user data have been 
generated for several profile creation schemes, training 
periods and levels of event abstraction and are displayed 
and discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses other 
related work in the field of detection of insider misuse.  
We draw our conclusions in Section 6 and discuss how 
this current research may be extended in Section 7. 
2 System Design – User Profiling and Event 
Abstraction 
Our aim has been to develop prototype software that 
implements a capability to identify events that are 
anomalous and may be indicative of computer misuse 
within an organization.  We have in addition collected 
data for evaluating the effectiveness and performance of 
the software and have used it to do so.  We worked with 
data from the Windows security audit log from computers 
running the Windows XP operating system.  When 
various audit controls are enabled, these logs record 
information about user log on sessions and the 
applications or processes invoked by the users of the 
computers and by the computer system itself. 
2.1 Summary of the Design 
Our approach consists of six main stages which are 
summarized below.  Further detail of these steps is 
provided in Section 3 of this paper. 
 Data Collection and Preparation – Windows 
Security log data is collected using a VB script run daily 
to collect, compress and clear the log file.  Further 
conversion steps are applied to the logs before any data 
reduction steps are undertaken as the Windows Security 
log is stored in a proprietary binary format. 
 Data Reduction and Correlation – As the amount of 
data collected from the log sources is voluminous, only 
events which are recorded as a direct result of user action, 
such as logging in, logging out and starting and stopping 
applications, are used for further investigations.  The 
approach taken for correlation is similar to that used by 
Abbott, Bell et al (2006) where event abstraction is used 
to recognise logical events from the raw events recorded 
in the logs. 
 Data Storage – For further processing, including 
preparation of user profiles and alert generation, the data 
is persistently stored in a relational database. 
 Profiling – User profiles are generated so that users’ 
normal or habitual use of applications can be determined.   
 Alert generation – Simple alert types are defined 
based on the data recorded in the user profiles, and usage 
data for users from ensuing time periods are used for 
comparison. When abnormal events are detected, alerts 
are generated.  
 Alert checking – When alerts are generated it is 
necessary for them to be checked to determine if they are 
benign or if there is some real threat behind the cause of 
the event.   
2.2 Profile Generation and Training 
Before a profile can be generated for a particular user we 
must have that person’s usage data for a specific 
continuous period of time.  The training period should be 
selected so that most of the routine activities a user 
  
performs are included.  This will likely be different for 
different users.  For this paper we determine this time 
period empirically.  
We suggest three possible approaches for generating 
the user profile.  The first approach is to use a static or 
constant window user profile.  With this approach 
detection of alerts is carried out on a weekly basis after 
the training period and the user profile remains the same 
for each week of testing.  Alerts are always generated 
based on that initial user profile.  This approach is likely 
to generate many alerts as the person’s usage changes due 
to their role changing within their organization or when 
software updates are applied.  We concede that this is 
unlikely to be a successful approach but it provides a 
baseline for comparison with other approaches.     
A second approach is to use a growing window, 
where the profile training time period is continually 
extended by adding events to the user profile from the 
testing period after alerts have been generated for the 
week under test.  It is necessary for feedback to be given 
about whether or not the event causing an alert is benign 
before it can be added to the training data.  With this 
approach, the user profile becomes dynamic and captures 
changes in a user’s behaviour or in the user’s 
environment due to software updates.  A possible 
problem with this approach is that the user profile may 
retain too much stale history especially if a user’s role 
changes over time. 
A third approach is to use a sliding time window for 
the user profile where the width of the time window 
remains constant.  After training the user profile and 
generating alerts based on the data from the testing week, 
the user profile is recalculated by removing the oldest 
week of profile data and adding the new week of data that 
has had any events causing false alerts. This approach is 
dynamic in nature and does not allow the user profile to 
become cluttered with too much historical data.   
2.3 Event Abstraction 
The previous section discussed how we created user 
profiles.  The creation of the profiles is based on the 
usage of specific processes, that is, specific versions of 
applications, each of which has its own path and 
executable name.  A limitation with this approach is the 
high number of alerts that may be generated for a user.  A 
user’s activities are likely to change over time as that 
person’s duties or roles change within their organization 
and the software tools and applications which a person 
uses is not a stable set.  In addition, applications in a 
user’s profile will change as the applications in use are 
upgraded or changed by the organization. 
Some questions which need to be considered then 
include:   
1) Are executables and applications in an 
organization’s SOE similar enough in nature to be 
grouped together in some way? 
2)  Should different versions of the same application 
be grouped together in a user’s profile? 
For example, a person in a clerical role in an 
organization would be likely to use tools from an office 
suite like Microsoft Office, including Word, Excel, 
PowerPoint and Outlook, and a software developer might 
use an Integrated Development Environment like Eclipse, 
and may require the Java Standard Development Kit, an 
SQL Database server, and a repository tool like 
Subversion.  Each of these applications is likely to be 
upgraded to the latest versions by the organization as they 
become available.  Alternatively, the organization may 
change its software procurement policies, meaning that 
completely different suites of applications may be used. 
We propose two types of groupings or abstractions for 
applications, which we have termed process families and 
process groups.  We compare the use of process families 
and process groups with individual processes for profile 
and alert generation. 
The first grouping type, process families, is based on 
families of applications or processes that are used for 
similar purposes, as discussed above, e.g. software 
development or office administration.  All applications 
and by extension, the process names and their paths that 
are recorded in the security audit logs, can be assigned to 
a process family.  Further details on how this was 
implemented are given in Section 4. 
The second type of grouping, we have named process 
groups.  Process groups are constructed from clusters of 
applications or processes which are grouped on their path 
and their executable name.  Using this approach 
processes with the same value for their path or processes 
with the same value for their executable name will be 
grouped together.  This allows all applications that are 
run from the same directory along with all version 
updates to belong to the same process group.   
2.4 Alert Checking 
Alerts that are generated in a user profiling system 
would most likely require human processing, although if 
an organization’s security policy specified a Standard 
Operating Environment, alerts could first be 
automatically checked against that.   
It is desirable in any system that is checking 
employee’s activities that there be as few false alerts as 
possible, so that system administrators are not wasting 
time or becoming complacent because they are checking 
numerous alerts. 
In organizations which have a SOE there will be some 
users who are granted higher level privileges, including 
the right to install software which is not included in that 
SOE.  In these situations, the user profile is important for 
reducing the number of alerts that may be generated. If a 
user profile is recorded for a person, software which is 
not part of the SOE would only have to be checked the 
first time an alert is generated.  It could be marked as 
normal or acceptable use and become part of that 
person’s user profile.  Once it is part of the user profile, 
further usage of that software would not cause any alerts 
to be generated. If the organization did not perform user 
profiling, and relied on checking all application usage 
against the SOE, every usage of software not in the SOE 
would cause an alert to be generated. 
3 Implementation and Experimental Methodology 
The following sections describe how we implemented the 
system and the experiments we undertook to find the best 
set of parameters. 
  
3.1 Data Collection and Preparation 
The Windows Security logs collected and examined 
during the course of the project were from desktop 
computers running Windows XP Professional Edition 
with Service Pack 3 installed.  Local event logging was 
enabled and all available auditing options were set.  
Further to this, auditing of file accesses was enabled 
where possible at the root level of the logical disks on the 
computers being logged.   
Under normal usage during office hours, with all 
auditing options enabled, over 1 million events were 
generated daily.  Even though the Security log is meant to 
be able to be configured to grow in size to 4.5 GB, the 
maximum log size achieved on the systems under study 
was approximately 10% of this at 450 MB.  The auditing 
of Object Access with all accesses to all files on the 
workstation being audited lead to the rapid growth of log 
files and was turned off after one month of data collection 
to conserve processing time and storage space.   
A VB script was prepared which saved and emptied 
the log and compressed it to preserve local disk storage.  
ELDump (Lauritsen 1998) was used to convert the binary 
event file to a text version for further processing and 
analysis.  Data was collected for a period of nine 
consecutive months on one of the Windows computers 
and eighteen months on the other.  Table 1 displays the 
number of login sessions and the number of applications 
started for each user on the computer systems being 
surveyed. 
 
Computer 
Name 
Days of 
Data 
Collection 
Number of 
Login 
Sessions 
Number of 
Processes 
Started 
GANDALF 297 348 27,821 
ARAGORN 531 124 953,429 
Table 1:  Information about logged data for the 
computers studied 
3.2 Data Reduction and Correlation 
A great deal of information useful for extraction of a 
user’s activities is recorded in the Windows Security log.  
All events in the Windows Security log contain some 
common data, such as the date and time stamp, computer 
name, domain name, user name, event type and identifier 
numbers, and further information specific to each type of 
event.   
For user profiling, the most useful event types include 
log on, log off, process start and process exited events.  
These provide details of a user’s log-in sessions and 
interactions with the applications and services installed 
on the computer.   
It is necessary to correlate log on and log off events to 
determine the duration of a user’s log in session.  This is 
possible in the Windows Security log by matching the 
value in the Session Identifier field of the event.  
Similarly, the process start and process exited events 
from a specific user and log in session can be matched to 
determine the duration of a user’s application usage.  This 
can be done by matching the Session Identifier, Process 
Identifier and Process Name for the relevant events.  
When the matching process exited event occurs, the 
duration for which the process ran can be recorded.    
When full auditing is enabled in the Windows 
Security log, Object (file handles, network resources etc.) 
accesses are recorded in the log and these are recorded 
with the specific process name and process identifier 
which accessed the object.  Many hundreds of object 
access events are recorded while an application is being 
used.  For this work, the object access events were 
neglected due to the complexity of data recorded in them.   
3.3 Data Storage 
Relational database tables were used to store information 
relating to users and their activities on the computers 
studied.  Information from the Windows Security logs 
was stored for each user of each computer.  This entailed 
an entry for each log-in session including the start and 
end times of the session and the total number of 
applications invoked by the user during that session.  
Entries were also stored for each application including the 
name and full path of the application, start and end times 
of the application, and details of the parent process 
responsible for invoking the application.  In many cases, 
the parent process is Windows\explorer.exe as this is 
the desktop application that the user interacts with when 
using the Windows XP operating system.  For example, 
when the Eclipse IDE application is started from the 
desktop, Windows\explorer.exe is recorded as the 
parent process of the Eclipse\eclipse.exe process.  
Many processes, however, are spawned by an application 
a user may have started.  For example, when a user starts 
a Java application from within the Eclipse IDE, the 
Java\bin\javaw.exe process is invoked to run the 
Java application but it is invoked by the 
Eclipse\eclipse.exe process.  This information 
could allow complex hierarchies of process usage to be 
determined.  The hierarchical nature of the processes was 
not analysed for inclusion in this paper. 
3.4 User Profiles 
To generate user profiles we collected data on the usage 
of which applications a person started.  In particular, we 
chose to record the following attributes which were used 
for the generation of alerts:   
1. The hour of the day an application was started;  
2. The day of the week an application was started;  
and 
3. Whether or not the application had been run by 
the user previously 
A time period for user profile construction also had to be 
considered.  Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of 
new processes used by different users for the data we 
collected.  There are a large number of processes 
recorded for the first time, for a user in the first eight 
weeks or so of the logs and then the rate of new processes 
recorded tapers off slightly.   
We tested each of the user profile types introduced in 
Section 2.2, namely constant time window, growing time 
window and sliding time window.  For these experiments, 
we tested each combination of profile type and process 
  
abstraction type with 14, 28 and 56 day initial time 
periods for the user profile. 
To ensure that all experiments could be compared with 
each other, the end date for the training period of the 
initial time window was set as a constant.  All alerts 
generated in successive weeks were based on the same set 
of usage data.  This means that the starting date of the 
initial time window for the 56 day training period 
precedes the starting date of the 14 day training period by 
42 days. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Cumulative Count of New Processes Used 
by a User 
3.5 Alert Generation 
Once the different profiles were created, alerts were 
calculated for a seven day testing period directly 
following the profile training period.  The total number of 
alerts for the week for each of the attributes measured, i.e. 
hour of day that a process was started, day of week that a 
process was started, and if a process was started for the 
first time, were recorded.   
For the purposes of comparison of different 
approaches in our system, all events causing alerts have 
been considered to be benign or in other words, false 
positives.  After the testing was carried out on each 
week’s data, the dynamic user profile types were 
regenerated to include all events from the week’s data 
that was just tested.  The results reported in Section 4 for 
each experiment are the cumulative number of alerts for a 
period of thirty weeks of alerting for each of the two 
users for which we had data. 
3.6 Abstraction 
As discussed in Section 2.3, we have proposed two 
abstractions for collections of processes for reduction of 
the number of alerts generated by our system.  Our 
experiments have also recorded the results when the 
abstractions were not used. 
The first of the abstractions we proposed was process 
families.  For the security audit logs collected from the 
computers under study, nine process families were 
created from 2,204 differently named processes.  The 
nine process families were: operating system tools, office 
applications, games, security tools, browsers, 
development tools, servers, utility applications and 
installers. This was a laborious and manual task, although 
some of the processing could have been automated, e.g. 
all applications in a particular directory hive could have 
been labelled as part of the same family.  In a large 
organization, such an approach without automation would 
be prohibitively expensive to deploy. 
The second abstraction proposed was process groups.  
These groups were generated programmatically using a 
clustering approach.  For each distinct process name 
recorded in the security audit logs, the full process path 
was extracted and split into a path name and a process 
name.  For example, the process C:\Program 
Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_17\ bin\java.exe has a 
path value of C:\Program 
Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_17\bin and a process name 
value of java.exe.  All applications with the same path 
as the java.exe executable are considered part of the 
process group, e.g. javaw.exe and javac.exe.  
Continuing with the construction of this process group, 
applications from different versions of the Java SDK bin 
directory are grouped together: 
 C:\Program 
Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_17\bin\java.exe 
 C:\Program 
Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_17\bin\javaw.exe 
 C:\Program 
Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_16\bin\java.exe 
 C:\Program 
Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_16\bin\javaw.exe 
 C:\devel\jdk1.6.0_10\bin\java.exe 
 C:\devel\jdk1.6.0_10\bin\javaw.exe 
 ...  
The process groupings were constructed for the data 
sets collected from each computer.  The number of 
process groups formed and the original number of distinct 
processes are recorded in Table 2.  The distinct process 
names are based on the full path and executable name as 
recorded in the computer logs.  This table also records the 
number of distinct executable names and the number of 
distinct directories in which those executables were 
located. 
 
Computer GANDALF ARAGORN 
Distinct Processes 561 1099 
Distinct Executables 424 747 
Distinct Directories 255 576 
Process Groups 153 271 
Table 2:  Number of Process Groups Formed 
For both process families and process groups, the 
alerting process using the three different profile types for 
user profile generation were tested and compared with the 
results where no abstraction of processes was attempted 
for each of the three initial time window period. 
4 Experimental Results 
The number of alerts for the three alert types (new 
process, new hour for process and new day for process) 
were collected for each of the three profile type training 
schemes (constant window, moving window and growing 
window) for initial training periods of 14, 28 and 56 days.  
The alerts were generated for the data sets collected from 
both computers under study for a period of 30 weeks with 
regeneration of the dynamic profile types after each week 
of testing.   
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These results were collected for processes as the 
baseline case, and for process families and process groups 
to determine the effect of the different abstraction 
mechanisms. 
In all tests, the starting date for alert generation for a 
particular computer began on the same date, so that the 
effect of training period could be compared.  This means 
that the training periods extended back to different 
starting dates for the different training periods.  The total 
number of alerts for the thirty week period for each of the 
tests conducted is displayed in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  The 
results are discussed in further detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
4.1 Baseline Case – All Processes  
Table 3 displays the number of alerts generated for the 
different training approaches for user profile generation 
for both computers, using three different initial training 
time windows.  
It can be seen for the three different training 
approaches when longer initial training periods were 
used, fewer alerts were generated.  This is an expected 
result as the trained profile contains more information 
when a longer training period is used. 
The results indicate that the training approach which 
generates the fewest alerts is the Growing Window 
approach.  This approach is dynamic in nature and retains 
all past history for a user.  While the Moving Window 
approach is also dynamic, it would appear from the 
results that when past history is removed from the user 
profile, higher numbers of alerts are generated.  The 
Moving Window approach generated fewer alerts than 
the Constant Window approach for one computer but the 
results were reversed for the other.  
 
Training Period 
(days) 
GANDALF ARAGORN 
New Day Hour New Day Hour 
14 
Constant 
Window 
425 484 466 514 581 581 
28 412 477 465 495 567 565 
56 301 378 390 454 543 549 
14 
Moving 
Window 
380 428 424 585 600 601 
28 362 417 411 549 582 586 
56 346 398 405 525 568 574 
14 
Growing 
Window 
191 295 284 450 534 536 
28 180 283 278 495 564 563 
56 165 248 267 454 541 547 
Table 3:  Number of Alerts Generated over 30 Weeks 
for Processes 
4.2 Process Families 
Table 4 shows the results of alert generation when 
processes were grouped together into process families as 
outlined in Section 2.3.  
It can be seen that the frequency of alerts dropped 
significantly when processes were aggregated into 
process families.  This level of aggregation is clearly too 
coarse to be useful.  As soon as one process belonging to 
a process family is used, no other processes from that 
family will generate an alert.  
Training Period 
(days) 
GANDALF ARAGORN 
New Day Hour New Day Hour 
14 
Constant 
Window 
2 6 3 2 3 4 
28 1 3 2 0 2 3 
56 1 2 2 0 1 3 
14 
Moving 
Window 
3 9 9 3 7 6 
28 2 8 4 0 3 3 
56 2 4 3 0 1 3 
14 
Growing 
Window 
2 3 3 2 3 4 
28 1 2 2 0 2 3 
56 1 2 2 0 0 3 
Table 4:  Number of Alerts Generated over 30 Weeks 
for Process Families 
4.3 Process Groups 
Table 5 displays the results of the number of alerts 
generated when processes were clustered together into 
process groups using the approach outlined in Section 
2.3.  It can be seen from the results that the number of 
alerts from the 30 week testing period is significantly 
lower than when individual processes were tested.  The 
number of alerts generated for the growing window 
profiles with eight weeks of training data produce on 
average three or four alerts per user per week.  For a large 
organization this could still be a significantly high 
number of alerts in total but it is a significant 
improvement on the average of five to twenty alerts per 
user per week when no aggregation is used. 
 
Training Period 
(days) 
GANDALF ARAGORN 
New Day Hour New Day Hour 
14 
Constant 
Window 
96 129 120 126 159 154 
28 88 123 118 115 143 139 
56 85 112 112 98 134 130 
14 
Moving 
Window 
122 142 141 155 164 165 
28 117 141 133 133 149 153 
56 97 120 118 126 145 148 
14 
Growing 
Window 
112 141 131 98 131 129 
28 105 134 123 98 128 127 
56 85 109 112 89 119 115 
Table 5:  Number of Alerts Generated over 30 Weeks 
for Process Groups 
The results for process groups also indicate that the 
best technique for user profile generation as measured by 
reducing the number of alerts is the Growing Window.  
This is discussed further in Section 6. 
5 Related Work 
There are quite comprehensive event monitoring and 
event correlation products on the market.  However they 
are typically platform specific and focus generally on 
network event correlation and/or centralized event 
monitoring and log management rather than post hoc 
correlation of events for forensic purposes.   
We note also a considerable body of research in the 
area of security event correlation, ranging from alert 
correlation in intrusion detection systems (Ning, Cui et al. 
2004; Morin, Mé et al. 2009) through to the 
standardization and formatting of audit or log records 
(Bishop 1995; Kent and Souppaya 2006) and audit 
reduction (Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2003).   
  
Specific related work in insider misuse detection quite 
commonly has implemented systems aimed at specific 
operating systems without mention of the system’s 
applicability for other operating systems (Christoph, 
Jackson et al. 1995), or have developed approaches not 
aimed at operating systems at all, e.g. for database 
systems (Chung, Gertz et al. 1999).  It is also quite 
common for researchers to use simulated data (Maybury 
2006; Anderson, Selby et al. 2007). 
Security personnel at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (Christoph, Jackson et al. 1995) implemented 
an approach to detect security policy violations on 
computer systems.  This was capable of detecting 
activities by insiders abusing operating system privileges 
and outsiders attempting to gain clandestine access.  They 
produced Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion 
Reporter (NADIR) and UNICOS Real-time NADIR 
(UNICOS) to summarize user and system activity 
profiles.  This system was aimed specifically at the 
UNICOS operating system and no extensibility was 
considered. 
Chung, Gertz et al (1999) created a misuse detection 
system for relational databases.  They computed user 
profiles from audit log data in an attempt to detect insider 
misuse of a financial database system in use in a bank.  
They present scenarios based on a bank teller misusing 
their privileges to gain customer credit card information 
or to transfer customer funds to their own account. 
Another work by Shavlik, Shavlik et al. (2001) 
focused on profiling and identifying Windows 2000 users 
via keystroke dynamics.  This work was intended to 
complement insider misuse detection rather than to detect 
insider misuse.   
Maybury (2006) reported on a collaborative, six 
month workshop to characterize and create analysis 
methods to counter sophisticated malicious insiders in the 
United States Intelligence Community.  His paper 
discusses a generic model of malicious insider 
behaviours, distinguishing motives, (cyber and physical) 
actions, and associated observables.  The paper outlines 
several prototype techniques developed to provide early 
warning of insider activity, including novel algorithms for 
structured analysis and data fusion and reports 
performance assessment in an operational network 
against simulated insiders (an analyst, application 
administrator, and system administrator).   
Anderson, Selby et al (2007) report on their behaviour 
profiling and misuse detection system, IRIS, which 
involves an intricate architecture of components to 
achieve real-time anomaly detection based upon a variety 
of inputs including operating system logs.  IRIS employs 
the proprietary MQ Telemetry Transport protocol 
(MQTT) implemented by the IBM MQ MicroBroker.  
The system has been deployed to date only with 
simulated data and the authors note that their system 
requires a comprehensive set of user data, suggesting 
periods of time of the order of years.   
Cathey, Ma et al (2003) concentrate on the detection 
of insider misuse in information retrieval systems.  Their 
rules based approach is based on the creation of user 
profiles and relies on each user’s profile recording the 
types of documents that the user is allowed to retrieve 
from the information retrieval system.  Again, this work 
is quite different to the research we have undertaken. 
Ma and Goharian (2004) built user profiles to detect 
misuse in search systems based on activities learnt 
through clustering and relevance feedback.  Goharian and 
Ma (2005) showed that they could achieve equivalent 
results to Cathey, Ma et al (2003) in detecting off-topic 
accesses to files in an information retrieval system by 
using a subset of the features that were originally 
proposed.  The research presented in these approaches 
has focused on the detection of insider abuse of privileges 
by detecting anomalous behaviour from access control 
lists either prescribed by system administrators or from 
definitions generated from “learnt normal” behaviour. We 
note that these approaches have not targeted an operating 
system’s Security Audit event logs and the applications 
used for generation of user profiles but have concentrated 
on file and document accesses. 
Magklaras and Furnell (2006) have produced a threat 
prediction specification language for modelling insider 
threat and intrusion incidents.  This approach is quite 
different to the anomaly detection approach which we 
have presented in this paper. 
Other researchers in the field of insider misuse 
detection have defined the threat of insider misuse 
(Bishop and Gates 2008; Pfleeger and Stolfo 2009) but 
have not moved to implementation.  There have also been 
some frameworks for insider misuse proposed (Baek, 
Kim et al. 2008; Zhang, Ma et al. 2009) but again, these 
have not been fully implemented. 
None of these papers have discussed the likelihood of 
high levels of false positives or ways to address this 
problem.  There has been no mention in any of these 
papers of the different approaches we have presented for 
training user profiles and there has been no discussion of 
abstractions for collections of user applications. 
6 Conclusions  
We have shown that it is possible to build user profiles 
from data recorded in the Security Audit logs of 
computers running the Windows XP Operating System.  
The main information used from the events logged has 
been the names of the applications invoked by the users 
of the computers.  It should be possible to use the same 
approach for any computers whose operating system 
records similar data. 
We outlined three different approaches to generating 
user profiles, where a constant window or a growing 
window or a moving window can be used to specify the 
training time period used in the user profile.  A user’s 
profile may change due to a change in their role or may 
be due to software upgrades or changes imposed by the 
user’s organization.  Ideally such changes should not 
cause a major increase in the number of alerts generated 
by the system. 
Our experimental results indicate that the growing 
window approach generates fewer alerts than the moving 
window approach and its dynamic nature captures 
changes in usage of applications without generating an 
excess number of alerts.  This is thought to be due to the 
growing window approach not losing any past history 
from the user profile. 
  
Our results also indicate that a longer training period 
will result in a richer user profile which has the effect of 
generating fewer alerts. 
We also proposed and implemented two groupings of 
processes in an effort to reduce the number of alerts 
generated by the system.  One of these, Process Families 
where all applications used on the computers were placed 
in a small number of groups, was too coarse in its 
groupings to be useful.   
The second approach we named Process Groups and 
created by clustering together applications with the same 
path and/or the same executable name.  This approach 
resulted in a significant reduction in the number of alerts 
when compared to individual process names, three to four 
alerts per user per week.  We conclude that the use of this 
abstraction provides a positive benefit to the overall 
system 
It is of course necessary to investigate any alerts that 
are generated by a system such as the one described in 
this paper.  If an organization employs a Standard 
Operating Environment, alerts generated from the first 
invocation of a process or process group could be 
automatically checked against the list of software in the 
SOE.  Such a check should result in a further reduction in 
the number of alerts that need to be manually checked. 
All user profiles have been generated for individual 
users.  Using the abstraction approach it should be 
possible to make comparisons between users based on the 
collection of processes in their profile or alternatively to 
create profiles for an organization.  Based on the role of 
similar people in the organization, a profile could be 
assigned based on the expected usage of applications.  
The profile could then be dynamically updated as the user 
settles in to their work routine.  If this were done, there 
would be no need to wait for a training period for a new 
employee in an organization before their usage is 
routinely monitored.  Care would have to be taken with 
such an approach that the user profile is properly 
regenerated once the employee has been working for the 
training window time period. 
We believe that the approach outlined here for users 
of PCs could also be applied to other sources of data.  
Any source of data where user’s actions are recorded 
could be used, e.g. web proxy logs where people’s web 
browsing habits are recorded or ERP systems where user 
transactions are recorded.  A possible application for this 
approach with ERP systems is the detection of financial 
fraud. 
7 Future Work 
In future work we intend to improve the system by 
changing and improving the way process groups are 
formed. When the process group clusters were formed, it 
was noticed that some of the clusters contained a single 
process name.  A further reduction in alerts may be 
achieved by aggregating single processes by using their 
process family rather than their process group, i.e. by 
using a mixed model of aggregation. 
Alternatively we could use some other means to 
determine if sufficient parts of a process’ path are the 
same for the process to belong to an existing process 
group.  This could be implemented as a set proportion of 
the path or it could use an edit distance measure with a set 
threshold determining whether two processes belong in 
the same process group.  
It should be noted that the work carried out to date is 
based on the presence or absence of a particular 
application in a user’s profile.  In future work we will 
utilise the frequency of usage of applications, allowing us 
to build probabilistic models of usage for each person.   
In our current work we have recorded but not made 
use of the amount of time that a user uses particular 
applications or groups of applications in their routine 
work.  This is calculated from the start and stop times 
recorded for each process in the Security Audit log.  By 
measuring the amount of time an application is used, 
better models of typical usage for a user can be built and 
this will be incorporated in our future work. 
We intend to investigate the proportion of time a 
process is actively used while it is open by making use of 
a library which allows the amount of CPU time an 
application uses to be monitored to provide a more 
suitable measure of application usage.  Keystroke logging 
tools may also provide a solution here as they can record 
which application is receiving key strokes and mouse 
clicks.  Further investigation into monitoring application 
usage is therefore warranted. 
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